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ABSTRACT 
Many argument s have been advanced concerning the economic 
basis of state formation. This essay summarizes these argument s and 
tests them -- albeit is a highly unsatisfactory way -- with data drawn 
f rom the sample of African societies archived in the Human Relations 
Area Files.  
Many of the arguments are "neo-contractarian"; they emphasize 
the role of the state in promoting economic efficiency . Others are 
loosely "neo-Marxist"; they emphasize the role of the state in 
securing the redistribution of income. 
Both kinds of arguments f ind support in the data . The paper 
therefore concludes by examining the degree to which the element of 
economic redistribution represents a "reasonabl e  price" for the 
provision of economic prosperity. 
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THE CENTRALIZATION OF AFRICAN SOCIETIES* 
It [is ] a principal theme of this book that a man who want s to 
secure and maintain a following mus t be ab le to off er hi s 
follower s some material advantage.  [Mair , 1962,  p .  160] 
The analysis of the origins of order in decentralized 
societies is  perhaps the mos t  famous contribution of African studies 
to the study of pol itics . Yet recent scholarship has argued that too 
much emphasis has been placed upon decentralized systems . On the one 
hand, their occurrence appears to be re lat ively infrequent; on the 
other , even insofar as decentra lized societies do exis t ,  they can 
arguably be regarded as transitory as societies which once were 
centralized or which are in the early s tage s  of a movement toward more 
centralized pol itical forms ( Horton, Jones ,  Stevenson ) .  
This essay examines various hypotheses concerning the economic 
basis for political centralization. For among the most frequently 
posited motives for the formation of s tates is the desire to achieve 
economic obj ectives � ones that presumably could not be achieved 
under decentralized politica l sys tems , s uch as those described by 
Evans-Pritchard.  
By po litical centralization is meant the surrender of 
voluntari sm as a basic principal of social action. Under a 
centralized system, individual member s of society are no longer 
decisive; they cannot veto coll ective decisions and unanimity is no t 
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required . Rather , socially binding act ions are taken by a subset of 
society' s member and individuals can be compelled to comply with 
decisions taken by these agents .  As empirical marks of central ized 
systems , we can note the exis tence of a bureaucracy, an army, or a 
central pol itical figure, such as a chief or monarch . The presence of 
such political attributes suggest a heightened capacity for coercion 
and the existence of pol itical figures capable of making socially 
binding choices.  
A key purpose of  this chapter is to formulate , characterize 
and expound argument s concerning the economic basis for s tate 
formation. Many of these argument s have been left implicit in the 
literature; mos t  are partial . An important obj ective of this essay is 
therefore to make the arguments explicit and fully to elaborate them. 
A second obj ective is to assess their credibility .  Concerning thi s 
second ta sk, a few comment s are in order . 
To evaluate the argument s concerning s tate formation, I employ 
the materials compiled in the Human Relations Area Fi les.  These files 
cons ist of an annotated compendium of historic and ethnographic 
reports concerning a sample of thirty-six African societies. 1 The
data are the richest available,  but they are seriously flawed . The 
number of cases is smal l .  The data were collected for one purpos e  and 
are being used for another; as a consequence, information is 
frequently mi ssing . And, mos t  gall ing , the principle of selection is 
unknown; there is no statement as to why one society is included and 
another is not ,  save for the fact that the one has attracted a greater 
amount of scholarly inves tigation. The nature and magnitude of the 
bias in the sample set of cases therefore cannot be e stimated. 
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In the f ace of such difficulties, I have decided that the 
appropriate s tance is one of modesty. I have used the data but I have 
approached their analysis as a "f ive finger exercise" - something 
that mus t be done but which can at best be small in scale and can 
never be decisive. I have therefore subj ected the data to simpl e 
cross tabulations , employing controls where numbers permit. While, 
for purposes of interpretation, I do assess the significance of the 
associations evidenced in these cross-tabulations , it mus t be stre ssed 
that the sampl ing procedures employed render significance tests 
relatively meaning less. The quality of the data render them 
THE "RICARDIAN" MODEL 
One of the basic arguments linking politica l centra liza tion 
with econo mic reward rests upon the desire of people to benefit from 
the gains in welfare which can be reaped from markets. In essence, 
the argument is Ricardian. Rather than attempting to be self-
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suff icient , different portions of society, it is held , can do better 
by specializing in the production of those goods in which , by dint of 
their resource endowments ,  they hold a comparative advantage and by 
exchanging a portion of those goods for those made by persons with 
diff erent resource endowments. In the context of this argument , the 
contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and thereby 
render production and exchange pos s ible for members of so ciety. the 
suggestive at best. Throughout this paper , I s trive to respect that 
origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be 
limitation. 
A last preferatory comment is in order. Correlational 
analysi s ,  rather than causal inf erence, is the highest level of data 
analysis to which this effort can aspire. One reason becomes obvious 
when the full range of hypotheses is examined : there are many 
possible economic "causes" of pol itical central ization. And given the 
small number of observations , it is difficult to isolate the effects 
of single variables,  as would be required for causal analysis. 
Secondly, and even more important: it is clear that in the case of 
mos t  of the hypotheses, causal effects run in both directions. In the 
face of reciprocal causation, and given that we lack longitudinal 
data , we can observe at best correlations among the variab les. 
reaped through the promotion of markets. 
This argument , of course, has been advanced in fields other 
than African history. Indeed, its most notable development has been 
in the history of Europe. Either in the guise of Pirenne's analysis,  
with its emphasis on exchange and trade and the role of government in 
protecting marketing center s,  or in the guise of Marxian analysis,  
with its emphasis on production and the role of the state in securing 
the interests of dominant classes,  the basic argument is repeatedly 
advanced:  that the growth of the market leads to the emergence of 
centra lized pol itical forms.2 
While thus echoing the works of other scholars,  ethnographer s 
and historians in Africa differ from them in important respects. They 
give particular emphasis to the role of trade; indeed , some have gone 
so f ar as to posit a distinctive Af rican state system -- one based on 
the extraction of the gains to be made from commerce (see Coquery­
Vidrov itch, Meillassoux).  Moreover, they develop distinctive themes 
in their treatment of this basic thesis, in part simply because they 
deal with a dist inctive subject matter. In particular, to a greater 
extent than their "European" counterparts, they contrast the 
efficiency of trade under decentralized pol itical systems with that 
under more centralized systems, and seek thereby to demonstrate the 
superiority ,  and thus the desirabil ity ,  of the latter. 
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Decentralized Systems: Perhaps the best analysis of the 
economic strengths and weaknesses of decentral ized l ineage systems is 
offered by Colson. Colson illustrates how trade was abetted by the 
lineage system of one decentralized group ,  the Tonga of Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia). Lineages were dispersed and "did not share a 
common residence" ( p. 606 ) .  A person wishing to make exchanges "could 
travel safely for considerable distances, provided be exercised 
caution" by moving along "the chain of kinship" ( ibid. ) .  In trading 
relations ,  the lineage system fortified property rights and provided 
security for exchanges: "In the event that a claim was not met, the 
l ineage bad the obl igation to take vengeance" ( ibid. ) .  The 
inst itution of the feud, characteristic of lineage-system societies, 
was used to provide security for those engaged in market exchanges: 
Those who wished a further safeguard could initiate a "bond 
friendship" with prominent men along the route or at the place of 
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destination. The man who accepted such a pact agreed to 
guarantee a friend's person and property while he remained within 
the neighborhood .  An attack upon either was considered a n  attack 
upon the host who could then summon kinsmen and supporters to 
retaliate against the offender. [Colson, 1 96 2, p. 606)  
Lewis f inds a similar system was at  work among the Somali; as 
be reports: 
To reach the coast in safety a caravan had to have protection on 
its journey among many dif ferent and often hostile clans. This 
was achieved by an institutionalized form of safe-conduct. The 
leaders of the caravan • • • entered into a relationship of 
protection with those amongst whom he passed on his way to the 
coast. Attacks on a protected caravan are attacks on the 
patron and his l ineage whose honor and "name" • • • can only be 
upheld by prompt retal iatory action. [I. M. Lewis, 1 96 2, pp. 
369-370)  
A system of lineage relations could thus be  used to support 
trade. But it apparently failed to do so efficiently. Colson 
indicates, for example, that the Tonga never really reaped the gains 
associated with economic specialization; they failed to specialize 
ei ther by region or by craft and instead cont inued to adhere to the 
"ideal of self-sufficiency" ( 1962, p. 607 ff).  Moreover , the 
literature from other decentralized societies strong ly suggests that 
even were the system of lineage relations able to generate significant 
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benefits, the costs of obtaining them in this manner appeared to be 
high. As noted in the last chapter , decentral ized means of protecting 
economic rights rest in large part on the ability and readiness of 
persons to employ force. Each party mus t invest in means of 
protection. And , once prov ided, each must demonstrate his willingness 
and ability to inf l ict retribution. Order, in e ss ence ,  is a by-
product of the institutionalized feud . Decentralization is thus a 
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organized trade in Southeastern Nigeria and provided as well a system 
of internal jus tice and military protection. Quot ing from interviews 
with lbibio headmen, Northrup describes how villagers would meet to 
decide whether or not to call for the Aro to settle in their area : 
At this meeting the advantage s  of a permanent Aro settlement 
(wealth, disposal of criminals and other unde sirables, exot ic 
goods and 'medicines , '  access to the Oracle) would have been 
costly system. 
The Centralized Alternative : Indeed ,  the literature strongly 
suggests that more centra lized systems are formed in order to avoid 
the turmoil of feuding . Ethnographers note that the so ciet ies now 
called the Alur actually imported chiefs f rom neighboring people in 
order to form a more central ized pol itical community .  They d i d  s o  
becaus e, with the f eud, they "did not have any formal means o f  
bringing hostil ities t o  a n  end" (Mair , 1 9 6 2 ,  p.  5 8);  the centralized 
system of chieftaincies was useful , for it "introduced new techniques 
of peacemaking , arbitration, and conflict management" and provided a 
wider and more eff ective system of law and order ( Southall,  1 96 5, p.  
80ff). Similar finding s  are reported for the Suk1DBa, the Anuak , the 
Tio, the kingdoms of Ruanda and Burundi , and for the societies of 
Southeastern Nigeria.3 
Nigeria, indeed, provides some of the mos t  interest ing 
insights into the relationship between exchange, feud s ,  and the 
organization of coercion. Northrup , Dike , the Ot tenbergs and other s 
have, for example,  analyzed the spread of the Aro ,  a group which 
weighed against the disadvantages.  ( The words • • • meaning 
greedy and 'tricky' occur with astonishing frequency in 
conver sations about the Aro . )  [ p .  127) 
The Aro were themselves traders ;  they provided protection for trade ; 
and they provided the "Oracl e" -- a j udicial system for resolving 
disputes without taking recours e  to f euds. These advantage s  led to 
their rapid expansion, Northrup and other s note , a s  local communities 
called them in ( for a related study , see Ruel). 
To secure the prosperity asso ciated with trade , then, 
decentral ized societies do contract for the services of more 
central ized systems . In addition, the evidence suggests that traders 
themselves preferred to transact with centralized groups . The ba sis 
for this preference is  revealed in the account s of early trader s ;  as 
discus s ed by Goody , these accounts suggest that strangers 
passing through the country were called upon to pay duty to 
divisional chi efs .  This payment w a s  a kind of protection money 
and, provided the charges were not exorbitant , traders usually 
preferred to travel in relative securi ty through such kingdoms 
rather than run the risk of being raided in the country of their 
chiefless neighbors. [ 1967 ,  p. 184) 
Testing the Argument :  There i s  thus an arguable relationship 
between the existence of gains from trade and the formation of 
centralized coercive organization s ,  capable of enforcing property 
rights and securing exchange relations . This argument can best be 
summarized in the form of Diagram I.  
----- Trade 
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Production 
In an effort to test the "Ricardian" arguments ,  I use a 
variety of indicators of centralization. I have also collected 
informat ion on a variety of factors relating to ecological variation, 
trade , and conflict.  
As has been stressed since the time of Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard, it is extraordinarily difficult to form a coherent typology 
of African political systems ( see,  for example , Lloyd ,  1965 and 1968 ;  
Southall, 1956;  Beattie, 1 95 9 ;  and the review article by Mair, 197 5) . 
In particular, the concept of centralization is sufficiently fuzzy to 
engender caution in all those who seek to array these systems along 
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that dimension. As a consequence, rather than try to generate any 
summary measure of centralization or to construct a unitary typology , 
I have chosen to employ a variety of measures of centralization and to 
examine the behavior of the so cieties with respect to each. 
The first distinguishes among the following : societies 
governed by a decentralized system of kinship, those in which there is 
a central monarch , and those in which there are chiefs ( but no 
monarch) . Groups representative of the first category are the Tonga , 
Luo , Dorobo , Tio, and Nuer ; examples of the second are the Mo ssi, 
Asante,  Ganda, Bemba and Nupe; groups of the third kind are the Yao, 
Chagga ,  and Mende . The second indicator of centralization is the 
existence of a central bureaucracy . The third is the presence of any 
form of national army . The last is the existence of a national army 
which is recruited and commanded by a central military figure. 
The "Ricardian" arguments sugge st that the existence of 
potential gains from specialization and trade motivate the formation 
of a political framework capable of s ecuring these gains .  But 
causality can run in the other direction as well; indeed, as has 
already been seen in the accounts drawn from the ethnographies, a 
centralized political system itself attracts trader s .  I n  the f ace o f  
such reciprocal causation, the best that can b e  hoped f o r  are 
correlations between the various measures of political the vari ety of 
key factors cited in the "Ricardian" argument s .  
The first such factor i s  ecological variation. I asked my 
coders4 to indicate whether the so ciety had an internally diver se
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ecology , whether i t  abutted a n  ecological divide ( e . g . , lay in the 
savannah but adj oining the forest), or whether it lacked proximity to 
any significant form of ecological variation. As s een in Table 1, two 
of the four measures of centralization -- those having to do with 
pol itical s tructure and the exis tence of a central bureaucracy -­
correlated with the factor of ecological diversity ; the existence of a 
national or centralized army did not .  
The second element in the arg11111ent is , the existence o f  trade. 
I asked my coders to look for evidence of organized exchange : the 
presence of market centers or caravans or of long distance trade. As 
seen in Table 2 ,  societies which pos se ss organized market centers more 
frequently had monarchs and a central bureaucracy ; those in which 
there were trading caravans more frequently had monarchs and a central 
bureaucracy and s l ightly more frequently possessed a national army as 
wel l ;  and those which engaged in long-distance trade far more 
f requently were ruled by chiefs and monarchs and more frequently 
possessed a centralized bureaucracy. Trade and pol itical 
centralization thus appear to go together , although the correlation is 
more characteri s t ic of "civil ian" measures of centralization ( the 
possession of chiefs and monarchs and a central bureaucracy) than it 
is of "military measures" ( the pos session of a national army or of any 
army under a central command). S 
The last element in the arg11111ent is the level of conf l ict.  In 
the context of thi s analysis , the most relevant of form of conf l ict is 
the f eud. If centralization is adopted as a more efficient means of 
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securing the benefits of economic exchange, then measures of 
centralization should correlate inver sely with the presence of f eud s .  
As seen i n  Table 3 ,  pol itical centralization decisively impacts upon 
the level of f euding ; societies with central monarchs and centralized 
bureaucracies f ar less frequently are subj ect to the costs of f euding . 
Before undertaking f urther analysis,  I wish to recall the 
parallels which these results bear to other historical materials. 
That long distance trade is related to the development of states; that 
there is an intimate link between the presence of organized market 
place s and the rise of centralized political forces; that the 
termination of f euding and the preservation of peace and order 
correspond with the rise of monarchs -- thes e  findings o ut of Africa 
resonate strongly with those from Western hi story, particularly from 
the medieval period. While the distinctive f eatures of African 
culture and history mus t be stressed ,  what is striking at thi s 
j uncture is the degree to which these f indings underscore the 
generality of the African experience. 
Augmenting the Ricardian Argument :  The basic s trategy of what 
is being termed the Ricardian argument is to relate institutional 
reform to gains in efficiency .  Institutional reform - - such as the 
development of the capacity to maintain peace in the market -- make s 
higher levels of well-being possible -- in this ca se, by faci l itat ing 
trade. As everyone could be better off under the new institution, the 
arg11111ent contends,  there are strong incentives for people to organize 
it.  One way or the other , it is contended , people will secure an 
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institution under which they all stand to gain. 
Ironically,  the basic problem with the argument is that it is 
insufficiently motivated. As the gains in efficiency from the 
innovation of new institutions are available to everyone,  it is in no 
one's particular interest to provide them. In essence, the gains 
which the new institution provide constitute a public good.  As all 
can enjoy these gains, each does better l etting someone else supply 
them. To secure the provision of new institutions , then, the logic of 
free-riding must be overcome. In this section, we examine one way in 
which this may be accompl ished : by conf erring an over-riding private 
interest in the provision of new institutional arrangements. In 
particular , we determine whether a maj or portion of the gains from 
trade were privately appropriable so that persons would be motivated 
to lobby for the institutional reforms which would make them 
possible.6 
One circumstance under which maj or private benefits would 
arise from establishing the pol itical foundations for peaceful trade 
would be if there were but a small number of economic agents, each of 
whom dominated a significant proportion of the marke t .  The benefits 
to each would then possibly outweigh the costs of providing those 
services which support the operations of the market .  While we cannot 
test this argument directly, we nonetheless can test corollaries of 
it.  
We would expect there to be , for example, a relat ively smal l 
number of relatively large-scale economic agents where economic 
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activity is characterized by large investments. Particularly in 
societies where capital market& are poorly formed, large investment& 
would involve the interests of only a few:  those who for  whatever 
reason were richly endowed. In Tabl e  4 we see that societies in pre­
colonial Africa in which there took place large investments of private 
capital ,  the pol itical system& more frequently possessed central 
monarchs. To a very slight degree, they more frequently possessed 
centralized bureaucracies and national armies as wel l ;  they less 
frequently were characterized by central ized command over the 
military, however . Had these data been drawn from a random &ampl e ,  it 
should be noted,  then none of the relationships would be statistically 
signif icant .7 
Further data is contained in Table 2 .  A maj or lesson 
contained in these data is that po l itical centralization is related 
not just to trade but to long-distance trade ( vide the data on 
caravan& and on whether trade was with proximate or distant sources) . 
The contention that long-distance trade is a basis for state formation 
has, of course, long been made by certain African scholars (Vansina 
1 96 2a ,  1 96 2b ; Coquery-Vidrovitch ) .  What is relevant here is that the 
pattern is what would be expected if efficiency gains must be 
privately appropriable in order to mot ivate the development of 
pol itical institutions . This assertion rests on several grounds. 
A key reason for the pattern& in Table 2 may wel l be that the 
capital requirement& imposed by long-distance trade meant that only a 
few could participate in it. By comparison with local trade , long-
distance trade involved goods of high value; only such goods could 
withstand the transport costs.  For security purposes, the goods had 
to be bulked and l arge n11111bers of carriers and defenders hired on. 
Moreover , a wages fund had to be created in order to maintain the 
enterprise over the period of travel . As Roberts sta te s :  
1 5  
A large ivory caravan -- and for self-defense it might n11111ber 
several hundred ( some ran into thousands) -- could not carry food 
for a long j ourney such as that between Tabora and the Coast 
(which usually took ten weeks). Instead,  it carried goods with 
which to buy food. Furthermore, all caravans had to pay tolls at 
various point s along a trade route and had to be suppl ied with an 
acceptable medium of payment . [ 1970, p. 52) 
The initial outlays were thus large by compari son with local trade of 
cheaper goods,  which, perforce, were marketed over shorter distances.  
Lastly , by comparison with local trade , the returns from long-distance 
trade were long post poned. As noted by Vansina, seasonality in the 
production of the goods involved of ten necessitated the protracted 
holding of expensive inventories ( 197 3 ,  pp. 8 ,  258) .  Moreover, large 
amounts of capital were tied up in goods in transit; the "turn around 
time" of long-distance transactions of ten involved many months. 
The higher value of the items exchanged; the greater 
investment in transport, security , and a wages fund;  and the larger 
amounts of capital tied up in inventories � these requirements 
insured that , by contrast with local marketing , only the wealthy could 
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engage in long-dis tance trade. As Dickson notes for West Africa : 
Trading was the prerogative of royalty ,  nobl es and rich men. The 
reason for thi s may have been mainly economic • • • for trading 
at distant places in those times of general insecurity 
required • • • a heavy outlay as only wealthy persons could 
afford . • • • The poorer sect ions of the population were • 
effectively excluded f rom large-scale long-distance trade 
al though there was no law expressly forbidding their 
participation in it.  [ p .  106) 
The relative concentration of benefits would help to explain why 
private interest would more readily trans late into demands for public 
s ervices in support of this industry , and therefore why long-distance 
trade tends to relate to political central ization.8 
Capital requirement s thus constitute one factor leading to the 
concentration of benefits from trade. Another is the apparently 
inherent expansionary behavior of the market s  thems elves. Market s  
tend to exhibit increasing returns t o  scale. In part,  the returns to 
scale derive from the fixed costs a sso ciated with entering a market :  
the cos t  of setting up business , unloading , and exhibiting wares, for 
example. They also ari se from other forms of fixed costs -- such as 
the provision of pol ice protection, shelter s for trader s ,  protected 
warehous e s ,  etc. They result a s  well from the decl ine in search costs 
for consummating exchanges as the number of traders increases; buyer s 
and sel ler s  can be more certain of making a transaction the larger the 
number of agents engaged in trade. For all these reasons , all else 
being equal, it may be cheaper to transact in larger markets. 
There are thus incent ives for markets to expand. Other 
f actors remaining equal, the number of markets would then decline. 
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The consequence is that the incent ives to lobby by trade groups 
s trengthens , for the benefits asso ciated with trading tend to be 
concentrated. Another consequence is  that the occasions for pol itical 
intervention become more frequent ; market centers would tend to engage 
in oligopo l istic rivalry as expansion leads to concentration and 
competition. The demand for state intervent ion, either to advance the 
interests of a particular market or to restrict rivalries between 
them, thus increase. 
The expansion in the size of markets , their decl ine in number , 
the resultant pattern of competition and confl ict between trading 
centers ,  and the mobilization of pol itical power in support of trading 
interests � these patterns , which are derivable from the economics of 
market places ,  are widely recognized themes in the historical 
literature on Africa. Bonner , for exampl e ,  notes the rise to 
prominence of Delagoa Bay as a trading center and the resul tant 
conf licts in Southern Africa to which this gave rise. As he states,  
"the volume of trade handled by Delagoa Bay expanded substant ially 
from the middle of the eighteenth century, and thi s promoted an 
escalation of conf l ict throughout the hinterland" (p. 7) . While the 
chief beneficiaries of the growth of trade in Delagoa Bay were the 
Tembe, Bonner concludes, "there are grounds for believing that each of 
1 8  
[ the other local ] kingdoms owed their early development t o  • • •
competition for trade" ( ibid.) . Stevenson, wri ting of Dahomey, notes 
that 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century there • • • emerged 
[a] maj or conte st for • • • domination in the trading zone, which 
in the Dahomey instance l ed to the reduction of the number of 
competing units. [ p. 220] 
Northrup too attributes increasing pol itical concentration among the 
trading s tates of coasta l Nigeria in part to the growth and expans ion 
of business conducted by individual trading centers. Consolidation 
was further abetted, he notes ,  by "the natural desire of European 
captains to be abl e  to gather an ent ire cargo f rom a single port 
rather than taking on partial cargoe s at each of several smaller 
ports" ( p. 87) and to the competition among the trading s tate s to 
which this gave rise. "As the trade • • • expanded, "  he conclude s ,  
"the coastal communities underwent gradual but decisive territorial 
growth [and] pol itical central ization" ( pp. 86-87 ) . The wars and 
rivalries asso ciated with the desire to secure the dominance of 
particular trade centers or trading routes are too frequently noted 
and too familiar to require further documentation here. 
These arguments thus allow us better to comprehend the 
relation between the existence of market centers and the development 
of centralized pol itical s tructures demonstrated in Table 2. They 
also lead us to expect further relationships in the data. They lead 
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us to expect, for example, that the greater the movement toward 
political centralization, the greater the tendency for societies to 
protect trade routes and marketing center s .  While the lack of 
information in the data sources renders the number of cases  
excessively small, the data do tend to support thi s contention: only 
central monarchs provided protection to markets and trade routes, they 
suggest, and those societies with nat ional bureaucracies and armies 
tended to provide it more frequently than did other s .  Moreover, 
contributors to the literature suggest that centralized s tates can 
secure the triumph of particular market s  or promote peace among 
competing ones .  We should therefore expect political centralization 
to be asso ciated with fewer instances of market rivalry . Again, 
missing information bedevils the data ; but what few data there are 
( e ight to twelve observations) s uggest that market rivalries are more 
frequently found in societies which lack chiefs or monarchs, a 
centralized bureaucracy, or a national army . 
There is, of cour se, a last reason for private interest to be 
linked to the political promotion of trade : the fact that the � 
can secure their incomes from the taxation of commerce. In an 
important recent essay, Robin Law argues that while West African 
societies were based on agriculture, West Af rican polities derived the 
bulk of their incomes not from agriculture but rather from trade (Law 
1 97 8). This position has also been argued, though in less detail, by 
Coquery-Vidrovitch . Should ruler s derive the bulk of their revenues 
from trade, then they would, of course, have strong incentives to 
employ their political power to promote it. Linked by the factor of 
taxation, states and market s  should therefore grow together . 
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The data only partially support thi s argument . I asked my 
coders to indicate for each society all the "s ignificant" sources of 
public revenue. The most frequently mentioned sources of revenue were 
agricultural: the ruler's own e states or gardens, his own cattle, or 
tribute, much of which was made up of agricultural products.  Forced 
labor and conf iscation were the next mos t  frequently ment ioned. Then 
came trade, with market f ee s  represent ing the lea st frequently 
employed source of public revenues .  
With centralization, trade d i d  in f act become a more 
frequently noted source of s tate income. I found that a s  
centralization increases market f ee s  and trade were more frequently 
cited as a significant source of public revenues .  As societies 
adopted centralized bureaucracies, they also increasingly drew on 
market f ee s  and trade for taxes .  With centralization, s tate s tax 
other things as well, however ; as centralization increased other 
sources of s tate income were more f requently ment ioned in the data 
files, none of these sources deriving from marke ts or trade. The 
increasing use of trade and markets as a source of public revenue may 
thus reflect not any systematic pref erence for the taxat ion of trade 
but simply the increasing ability of more centralized polities to levy 
taxes .  
While the data thus suggest that agriculture remains a 
significant source of public revenues, they do in one respect support 
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the thrust of Law's analysi s :  that with centralization goes an 
increased use of trade as a source of public income. This is  
suf ficient to suggest a self-interested basis for providing political 
support for commerce. The growth of the market and the rise of states 
may go together simply because of the increase in public revenues 
which the market can provide and the incentives which are thus 
supplied for public officials to protect and promote commerce. 
The fiscal link between trade and state formation arises in 
another fashion . Insofar as states derive their monies from taxe s on 
markets,  then it is politically undesirable to have proximate markets 
which are under separate j urisdictions. For when such markets exi st, 
traders can switch to the market which is less heavily taxed;  and the 
states ,  in search of revenue-yielding commerce, have incentives to 
lower taxes. Under such circumstance s ,  then, the states acquire fewer 
funds. They can attempt to negotiate a common tariff policy ; but 
given the advantages which accrue to the state with lower tarif f s ,  
such agreements tend t o  b e  unstable. Or they can consolidate their 
j urisdictions either through negotiation or conquest and then impos e  a 
single -- and presumably higher -- level of taxes .  Mechanisms of 
taxation can thus link the existence of markets to the expansion of 
state s .  These dynamics apparently underlay much of the "port 
politics" of West Af rica . Akinj ogbin, for example, stresses their 
importance in accounting for the rise of Dahomey . And s cholars o f  
later periods stre ss their significance in accounting f o r  the tendency 
of the colonial flags to follow colonial commerce in the period of 
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imperialist expansion in West Africa ( s ee, for example, Kimble) . 
Production : Thus f ar I have tended to concentrate on the 
market portion of the Ricardian argument. Significant arguments also 
arise with respect to the relationship between production and 
political organization. To these we now turn. 
Marxist analysis emphasizes,  of course, the centrality of the 
role of production in determining political relations. Moreover, in 
explaining the rise of the state , it gives primary emphasis to the 
role of capital. One need not be a Marxist, however, to argue that 
capital formation and political centralization go together. Major 
investments ,  for example, entail high present costs; the returns often 
accrue only after the passage of time. The acquisition of skills , 
moreover , represents a human investment -- one that also pays off only 
after the passage of time. Prior to investing in physical goo ds or 
human skills, therefore, people must be certain of their future 
returns . On these grounds alone we should therefore expect to find 
greater levels of investment in more highly organized political 
sy stems -- ones which offer greater prospects of peace and order 
than in systems which lack central agencies of coercion. Those making 
such investments would promote centralization, in other words, in 
order to secure stability. 
The argument echoes that advanced by some historians of 
American industrialization. Kolko , for example, argues that a reason 
for the abandonment of decentralized markets and the development of 
central regulatory agencies by the United States government in the 
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Progressive Era was that investors sought prof its from new capital­
intensive techno logies -- those centering on the stee l and rail 
industries -- and that their decisions required a stable and favorable 
planning horizon, one that could be e stablished by the mandating of 
set charges and price s .  A similar argument is advanced by scholars of 
developing societies . Guillermo O'Donnell, for example, relates the 
growth of bureaucratic power in Latin American countries to the need 
by investors for a stable economic environment prior to their 
commitment to the formation of fixed capital for heavy domestic 
indus tries.  
With respect to  the African data, we have already noted the 
relationships portrayed in Table 4 .  I also co llected data o n  the 
degree to which people held l arge inventories. This I used as a 
measure -- albeit a very awkward one of investment . And I 
coll ected data as wel l on the extent to which the so cieties contained 
craft specialis t s .  As seen in Tabl e  5, both measures s trongly 
asso ciate with the civ il ian indices of centralization. It should be 
noted that they do so even when controll ing for the importance of 
trade ; the relation is  thus not merely a corollary of our previous 
findings. 9 
There is additional ev idence for the relation between the need 
for economic s tabil ity and the ri se of central ized s tate s .  Historical 
s tudies suggest that those whose interests were tied to produc tion and 
trade sometimes took a distinctive position in debates over publ ic 
po l icy . In particular, they appear on occasion to have formed a 
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pressure group opposing the pursui t of war. Thus Wilks notes the 
formation of a "politica l party" in Ashanti which stood for "peace, 
trade and open roads" and opposed the continuation of warfare by the 
Ashanti mil itary elite as it threatened these obj ectives ( 197 5, pp. 
684f f ) . A similar lobby exi sted in Oyo; its activities apparently 
played an important role in the split between the Alafin and the .QIQ. 
Mesi that so characterized the po litics of that kingdom ( see Atanda, 
Awe, Morton-Williams, and Law ) .  Conf l icts between commercial 
interests and an ari stocracy which lived off warfare also constituted 
a major pol itical divide among the Wolof of Senegal and helped to 
promote the rise of Is lamic s ectarian movements in that and other 
savannah societies in pre-colonial West Africa ( s ee, for example, 
Cruis e  O'Brien) . 
Economic interests thus appear to have f avored peaceful, 
stable and predictable relations � one s that would allow them better 
to reap the rewards of their outlay s .  Insofar as pol itically 
centralized s tates could provide a more stable economic environment, 
then these interests all ied with the forces of central ization . But 
insofar as centralized agencies � such as mil itary force s 
threatened their prosperity, then these interests withdrew their 
support f rom that element of the centralized society. While a central 
army may provide protection for investments and trade, it can also be 
employed in political adventures -- something that threa tens the 
interests of those who need the certainty of an uninterrupted f low of 
posi tive returns before they can enrich themselves by investing. 
This argU111ent, which is largely derived from narrative 
sources,  helps to explain a strongly anomalous pattern in the data : 
the relatively weak performance of mil itary as opposed to civil ian 
indices of centralization. This contrast in the behavior of the 
civil ian and mil itary measures of central ization has hi therto been 
disconcerting . But, upon reflection, it is what would be expected, 
were inter-temporal stability a maj or obj ective of the po litical 
s trategies of major economic interests.  
DEMOGRAPHY, LAND. AND CROWDING : PROPERTY RIGHTS ARGUMENTS 
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The essence of the Ricardian model is that state power 
f acilitates the attainment of economic gains and that it does so by 
s ecuring property rights over returns f rom productive investment s or 
from transactions in the market place. There is a second strand in 
the literature whicb also stresses property rights ; but it looks less 
at trade and production than at people and natural resources.  
The argU111ent begins by noting the relationship between soil 
qual ity and s tate formation. When so cieties were located in areas of 
so ils o f  uniform quality ,  then, the literature sugge s t s ,  s ta te s  did 
not form. When they were located in particularly fertile soils , then, 
however , states may have formed. Col son, for example,  notes the 
disparity in soil qualities in East and Central Africa and comments :  
The soils elsewhere in Sub-Saharan f avoured shif ting cultivation 
with • • •  a dispersal of population. Exceptions were found in 
the intra- lacustrian region bordering on Lake Victoria with its 
rich vol canic soils • • • and in the flood plains of the Upper 
Zambez i ,  where soil fertil ity was renewed by the annual flood. 
[ 196 9 ,  p.  4 1 )  
It was i n  the intralacustrian area and Zambez i val ley ,  Co l son notes,  
that central ized states were formed. 
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In one of the major essay s  on the pol itics of pre-colonial 
Africa societies,  Gluckman ( 196 5) examines the dynamics of s tate 
formation. Gluckman explains the fai lure of states to form throughout 
much of Southern Africa in terms of the relatively uniform 
productivity of the land and in terms of its abundance . Thus , he 
argues ,  when "r ising nWllber s place • • •  a steadily increa sing 
pressure on the resources of [a ) tribe's terri tory [then) s ections of 
the tribe • • • moved away to [ o ther ) lands and to independence" 
( 1960, p. 16 1). It was only when goo d lands became relat ively scarce , 
he claims , that the process of state formation began, and in 
particular, that the region witne ss ed the rise of the Zulu nation. 
Gluckman's argU111ent concerning the Zulu -- who engaged in one of the 
most rapid and explosive instances of pol itical organization in 
recorded history -- has received s trong support from more recent 
scholar s ,  s uch as Bonner and Omer-Cooper . 
The literature thus suggests that we should expect greater 
degrees of pol itical centralization in areas of comparatively fertile 
so ils.  The data in Table 6 lend mode st support to thi s conj ecture. 
In linking the quality of natural resources to state 
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formation, scholars tend to invoke a second maj or factor : population 
density .  Particularly favorable natural endowment s tend to attract 
greater numbers of people. And as the density of population 
increases,  it is  held , the occasions multiply in which the the 
behavior of one person influences the productive activity of another. 
This is  particularly true with respect to land usage. The greater the 
number of claimants for land and the greater its relative scarci ty ,  
then the greater the extent to which one person's us e of this resource 
precludes another' s .  There is  thus a n  incentive t o  render land a 
well-def ined commodity : one that is amenable to compensation for its 
util ization. And the agency that enforces the rights which define 
commodities is, of course,  the state . This argument is  central to 
Engles' interpretation of the rise of "primitive" s tate s ;  ironically ,  
i t  is  also central t o  the new institutional economics a s  developed by 
such neo-classical economist s  as Dempsetz , North, Thomas, and Davis.  
The critical role of population density in pol itical change 
has been most thoroughly investigated in non-African settings . 
Carneiro, for example, has developed the concept "environmental 
circumspection, " which refers to the property of distinctive 
locational advantage which, he argues ,  induce s  a high density of 
population with an attendant rise of land scarcity ,  conf lict, and the 
formation of po l itical systems . And students of medieval history , 
such as Po stan and Ladurie, have related changes in population to 
changes in the extent and depth of the market ,  to changes in the 
distribution of income (via alterations in relative f actor prices) , 
and to changes in the institutional framework of agrarian societies, 
including their po l itical relations ( see also Brenner) . 
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Whil e  lacking the centrality achieved in other field s ,  such 
demographic hypotheses have been vigorously debated in the African 
literature as wel l .  Stevenson and Vengrof f ,  for example,  have argued 
the general propos ition that high population densities were asso ciated 
with the formation of s tate s .  The case ha s been most carefully and 
persuasively advanced in particular case studies , however ; so too has 
the contention that resource scarci ty and the need for mechanisms of 
conf l ict reso lution provide the maj or intervening variables. 
In his study of the Tio , for exampl e ,  Vansina notes that 
initial ly " land was w i thout v alue and anyone could a lways leave and 
build his own home where it pleased him" ( 1973 , p.  82) . As a 
consequence, "th e  loser s  could leave the game when they wanted 
to • • • People would split up long before they reached the level of 
actually fighting with one another" ( ibid) . But , he not e s ,  with 
denser population s ,  "the si tuation was different. There existed a 
limitation in f avorable sites • • • and the struggles  may have been 
more intense, with • strif e and warfare occurring much more
frequently" ( ibid , pp. 82-83). A maj or respons e  of the Tio ,  he 
indicate s ,  was the provision of pol itical officials to adjudicate 
disputes and to mediate conflicts over scarce resource s. A similar 
evolution is suggested by Roberts in his discus sion of the Nyamwez i. 
"Until the later nineteenth century, "  Roberts argue s ,  "there was 
l ittle pressure for chiefs to exercise authority over large number s of 
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people. There was n o  serious competition o f  the land-us e ,  such a s  
might call for regulation by superior authori ty" 0970,  p. 42) . With 
the growth of population, however, the situation apparently changed, 
and there was a movement toward the creation of more powerful 
chieftaincies ( s ee also Hopkins , p. 3 8) .  
I attempted t o  test the demographic argument . Direct tests 
were difficult, however, for estimate s  of population and area were 
of ten lacking and, when they did appear , they fluctuated widely 
between different sources .  There was no remedy for the first problem; 
to cope with the second, I simply abandoned any conf idence in "point 
estimates "  and instead computed both highest and lowest estimates of 
population dens ity. As seen in Table 7 ,  there was sometimes a strong 
relationship between the estimates of population density and the 
measures of political centralization . The higher the population 
density , the greater the level of political centralization . IO 
The arguments thus f ar suggest that favorable resource 
endowments attract large populations and that population density 
promotes the formation of political systems by generating a demand for 
the vest ing of property rights over scarce resource s .  Another 
pos sibility is,  of course, that population density promotes political 
centralization not by creating a need for property rights over 
resources but by promot ing the growth of markets and trade. The 
question naturally aris e s :  are not our previous f indings , summarized 
in the Ricardian argument , then spurious ? Do we not simply have a 
variant of Ladurie's "great demographic cycle" , wherein economic and 
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political change covary as a consequence of their shared relationship 
to population growth? The answer to thi s question lies in the use of 
statistical controls . While the small number of obs ervations 
available very severely frustrated attempts to control for the effects 
of population density ,  in a few cases,  enough obs ervations were 
available to introduce such controls.  Although the small number of 
cases severely devalues the significance of the relationships , we may 
nonetheless note that,  as illus trated in Table 8 ,  economic and 
political factors tend to be related, even after controlling for the 
dens ity of population. The data thus suggest that the relationship 
between economic activity and political centralization is not merely a 
consequence of the operation of more fundamental demographic factor s .  
RENT SEEKING 
The desire for economic prosperity can be linked to the 
employment of coercion in a variety of other ways.  One is  through the 
f actor of rent s .  Rents represent an economic value over and abov e 
what could be obtained in competitive markets. They can be created 
purposefully; monopoly rents ,  for example, accrue to those who 
restrict competition in product markets.  Or they can be created by 
nature. Special sites conf er particular advantages upon people 
fortunate enough to be located on them; being inherently scarce and 
non-mobile, these sites f avor a fortunate few and competi tive forces 
cannot erode their locational advantage. Rents accrue to those who 
occupy particularly fertile soils , a favorable geographic location, or 
an area with mineral deposits,  for exan1ple. Material advantages are 
conferred upon those who control such resources and they generate 
incentives for others to attempt to seize them. The existence of 
rents thus gives rise to tensions and conflict and motivates the 
organization and employment of force for economic purposes.  
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Exempl ifying these dynamics i s  Birmingham's discussion o f  the 
salt and copper mines of Central Africa. Control over the mines,  
Birmingham asserts,  made possible the levying of revenue s ;  those who 
"controlled the area allowed some neighboring peoples in to work the 
mines on payment of a fee, but others • • • were excluded from the 
area" ( p .  167 ) .  Moreover , it made necessary the organization of 
defense.  For in response to the existence of these rent s ,  he 
indicates, "the Portuguese tried to move inl and and gain control of 
the mines". And in response to the Portuguese incursions , "r esis tance 
forces of a far greater magnitude were mobil ized" ( p .  166) . The 
existence of rents in the f orm of mineral deposits thus increased the 
demand for the organization of force and the abil ity to mobil ize 
resources by which to supply it ( see also Fagan; Wilks ; Hopkins , pp.  
47ff ; and Sutherland-Harris) . 
Earlier figures show the relationship between land quality and 
centralization ( Table 6) and between trade and central izat ion (Table 
2) . The data in Table 9 show the relationship between the possession
of mines and the level of pol itical organization. In nearly all of 
the sixteen te sts of the argument possible with the data, the 
relationships run in the right direction. The presence of mineral 
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deposits tends to asso ciate with pol itical centra lizat ion. 
THE STATE AS MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
States not only assist in the performance of market s ;  they are 
also directly productive. For this reason as wel l ,  those seeking 
economic gain may seek the formation of states. 
States,  for example,  produce public goods.  We have already 
analyzed their role in producing security and property rights.  They 
also produce infrastructure. This apparently was a s  true in pre­
colonial Africa as it is elsewhere. For, as s een in Table 10,  the 
data generally support the contention that pol itical central ization 
correlated with the supply of public goods -- roads ,  bridges, canals 
and pontoons being the ones recorded. 
The states of pre-colonial Africa were productive in another 
sense.  For it appear s that in some instances they operated a s  
economic agencie s :  ones that secured inputs ,  organized them into 
productive enterprises, and generated a final product for exchange 
with other economic actors,  thereby generating prof its. 
In some areas ,  the state simply traded on its own account . 
Thus the Asante government maintained f rom time to time a state 
trading corporation, the Batafo , which marketed kola, gold,  and slaves 
in both the northern territories and the coast.  But the states 
usually lacked a relative advantage in such activities , and found that 
they could more efficiently generate needed revenue s by leaving the 
conduct of trade to private entrepreneurs and by taxing them. 1 1  
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The states did hold a relative advantage in some kinds of 
economic affairs, however : one s in which organized violence could be 
utilized as in a prof itable activity . One such area was in the 
securing of slaves .  Labor was a relatively scarce f actor ; compared to 
other factors, the marginal return to labor was high. With abundant 
and freely obtainable land, able bodied people could in many cases 
insure themselves of a prosperous subsistence livelihood; the 
opportunity costs of labor were therefore high and labor was costly in 
the marketplace. There were thus s trong incentives to use coercion to 
secure workers at below the market price. By forcibly extracting 
workers from the relatively prosperous subsistence sector and by 
compelling them to work at reduced levels of remuneration, those with 
control over the means of coercion could appropriate much of the 
returns to this scarce f actor ( for further discus sion, see Fage) . 
Sometimes slaves were used domestically in plantations, gold 
mines, or the public s ervice. In other cases, they were sold abroad . 
In either instance, warfare was used to generate economic advantage. 
As Vansina write s :  "The real reason • • •  that Angola needed war 
[was)  becaus e they bred slaves" ( 196 8 ,  p. 150). And as Roberts 
reports for the Bemba : "In the old days, at least, they took a 
po sitive pride in 'cultivating with the spear' " ( 197 3 ,  p. 182) . The 
close connection between state power and the slaving industry is 
under scored by the rise of such societies as the notorious Yeke -­
ones whose state systems specialized in the production of slaves. 
Conventional historiography sees the slave trade as leading to 
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a major decline in the political and economic systems of Africa . More 
recent work questions this assessment ( see, for example, Fage, Curtin, 
Law and Nor thrup) . While those societies which were conquered and 
enslaved clearly were weakened by the slave trade, there are few signs 
that those who initiated the capture of slaves "disintegrated" either 
politically or economically . Rather, using the export of slaves and 
the import of guns as indications of participation in the slave trade, 
our analysis suggests that the tendency to reevaluate the 
disintegrative effects of the slave trade may be correct.  For, as 
seen in Table 1 1 ,  it was never the ca se that societies which 
participated in the slave trade more frequently tended to exhibit the 
traits of political decentralization; and it was of ten the case that 
they more frequently were politically centralized. Moreover, as seen 
in Table 1 2 ,  measures of participation in the slave trade correlate 
with measures of economic prosperity : the presence of craf t 
specialists and trade, for example. Furthermore, as seen in Table 13, 
while the importation of guns associates with the tendency toward 
internal feuding, the exportation of slaves doe s  not, save in a 
negative fashion (neither relation would be statistically significant, 
however) . The slave trade was clearly harmful -- indeed, disastrous 
to some societies; but it thus appears not to have been politically 
or economically harmf ul to other s. Rather it appears to have played a 
role in their economic prosperity ; and rather than weakening their 
internal unity, it appear s instead to have promoted the forces of 
political centralization. 
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I t  will b e  recalled that i n  earlier sections we noted evidence 
of confl ict between economic and military interests. Measures of 
military centralization sometimes f ailed to correlate with measures of 
economic activity; and historical account s revealed tension between 
mil itary and trading interests in the traditional kingdoms of Africa. 
Our present analysis,  which stresses the relation between economic 
activity and the forceful appropriation of slaves, would appear to 
contradict the earlier arguments .  But the contradiction i s  only 
superficial . For in many periods slaving was profitable. And it was 
when i t  f ailed to remain so that the economic interests moved into 
opposition to those who organized the means of plunder. As Wilks 
notes for Asant e :  
The decline i n  the maritime market s  for slaves • • •  had the 
effect of making warfare less profitable and therefore less 
popular . ( 197 5, p .  6 8 1 ]  
There can b e  little doubt that it w a s  the sharp decl ine 
of the maritime market s  for slaves at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century that was one of the principal reasons for the 
failure of the imperial or war party to maintain control over the 
Asante councils • • • •  ( 197 5 ,  p. 6 80] 
Further evidence for the l ink between prof it maximization and 
slaving is the work of LeVeen and Gemery and Hogendorn; they report 
significant positive relationships between changes  in price and 
changes in the supply of slaves from West Africa, thus e stabl ishing a 
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nece ssary condition for arguing that the slave trade represented 
prof it maximiz ing behavior. Given that the slave trade and prof it 
seeking were so closely combined, we can thus comprehend how economic 
interests could both support and oppose the military, depending upon 
whether the economic climate favored raiding or other economic 
endeavor s .  
THE STATE AS MEANS OF REDISTRIBUTION 
With obvious exceptions , many of the arguments thus far 
presented in this paper are "neo-class ical" in spiri t. They stress 
the role of the state in securing economic prosperi ty . Inevitably , 
however , the paper has entered another realm of pol itical explanation: 
one in which the power to coerce is  seen not as a means of 
establishing a framework for common prosperity but rather as a means 
for redistributing income. Redistribution, as well as efficiency , is 
commonly a goal of political action; and this ,  of cour se, was as true 
in pre-colonial Africa as it has been in other periods and place s .  In 
this section we examine arguments which s tress the political basis of 
economic redistribution. We do so in large part by focusing on 
s tratification in African societies. 
One of the classic explanations for the formation of African 
s tates emphasizes the role of domination between divergent modes of 
agricultural production. While more recent scholarship ( s ome of which 
is summarized in Oliver 1 977) calls this interpretation into question, 
many scholars have stressed the role of the state in enabling 
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"pastoralists" to rule over "agriculturalists". Such arguments 
f eature in the ethnography of the intralacustrian area s ,  of course, 
but also in studies of the Shilluk, Rosvi,  and Zulu (Mercer, Mudenge, 
and Gluckman 1970) . In these and other societies , it has been held, 
pastoralist populations , with their valuable herds and their mastery 
of techniques of warfare, employ the state to exact tribute and 
s ervices from the sedentary agricultural ist s .  Al luding to the 
argument of Oppenheimer , scholars have thus interpreted the 
traditional state in Africa as a mechanism of pastoralist domination. 
The data only partially support this argument . They clearly 
indicate that domination by those who practice one form of 
agricul tural production over those who practice another does indeed 
necessitate po litical centralization (Table 14); three of the four 
measures of centralization correlate with domination by one or another 
of these groups . Contradicting the argument , however, is that the 
data suggest that the pattern of domination can f avor either group ; 
the ''warl ike pastoralists" are not always preeminent . Even more to 
the point is that ei ther pattern i s  very rar e ;  cohabitation rather 
than domination commonly characterizes the relationship between 
pastoralists and agriculturalists.  
Pol itical centralization and internal stratification can 
relate in other way s ,  however .  Through the power to l evy tribute, to 
collect taxe s,  and to structure property rights, those in charge of 
the state can employ it to induce patterns of inequal ity . Agrarian 
states commonly underpin stable patterns of collective advantage in 
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the form of estates and caste s .  A s  seen i n  Table 15,  this appear s t o  
have been true i n  pre-colonial Africa as wel l ;  with but two 
exceptions , the greater the degree of pol itical centralization , the 
more frequent the occurrence of an ari stocracy or a sy stem of caste s .  
I n  ear lier sections , w e  have noted the relationship between 
the formation of states and the growth of special ization and trade. 
Relevant to the present argument is another side of the relationship . 
Not only can the state be used to promote trade ; it can also be 
employed to restrict it. With more highly centralized pol ities,  not 
only can craft specialization develop (as seen in Table 5) but also 
craftsmen can better employ political power to restrict entry into 
their trade ( i. e. form guilds) , to limit output, or to set prices. 
Our data give limi ted support to thi s argument ; the pos session of 
monarchies and centralized bureaucracies does tend to a sso ciate w ith 
the adoption of restrictive pract ices (Table 16 ) ,  al though the 
relationship is neither significant nor clear cut and military 
indicators of centralization fail to behave in a similar manner . 
Materials from historical and anthropo logical account s provide further 
evidence. They suggest not only that states help to form and maintain 
market places � as seen in Table 2 -- but also that centralized 
govermnents are in a posi tion to impose non-competitive prices by 
abetting collusion among traders .  I n  one famous account , for example,  
Karl Polyani documents ( and lauds) the existence of such procedures in 
Dahomey ; a more lurid discussion is prov ided by the Tardits,  who 
describe the sanctions impo sed upon Dahomean marketers by the zangbeto 
3 9  
society , a secret society operating with the specif ic authorization o f  
the state : 
Zangbeto watches the merchants and if they find that a woman 
trespasses the law ,  the members of the asso ciation walk through 
the village for seven nights,  cursing the woman who disregarded 
the [customary price ] • • • •  If she doe s not comply, zangbeto 
will come out again, curse  her for sixteen more nights and carry 
through the village a banana tree branch wrapped in a cloth 
represent ing a corpse in a shroud . • • • The tradition says that 
the lawbreaker dies shortly afterwards .  [ pp.  101-102] 
The governance of the market places by the state thus no t only 
facil itates trade; it also f acil itates the restraint of trade and the 
securing of a redistribution of income. 
The marketers are not the so le beneficiaries of s tate support 
for non-competitive practice s ,  however. The rulers themselves also 
secure the advantages conf erred by state power .  Thus our data 
indicate that in over 80 percent of those societies which had 
governmental structures,  as opposed to merely structures of kinship , 
the chiefs possessed monopo ly rights of one kind or another ( Table 
17) . Table 18 indicates the most common forms of thi s practice.
Despite the argument s of many that little by way of economic 
advantage separated the political elites of Af rican state s  from their 
follower s ,  the data (Table 19) s trongly suggest that the ruler s l ived 
better : they were better housed, better clothed, better f ed ,  and had 
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greater access to productive resource s .  Govermnent and inequality go 
together, it would appear, in pre-colonial Africa j us t  as they do 
elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
The literature on traditional states confronts us with a stark 
choice : we are invited to subs cribe ei ther to the "neo­
contractarians , "  who see the state as a mechanism for securing 
collective advantage, or the "neo-Marxist s , " who see it as an agency 
of expropriation. 
Exempl ifying the first would be scholar s such as Elman 
Service . As with many whose arguments have been examined here, 
Service stresses the benef its of pol itical organization. He argues 
that these benef its alone would help to explain the adoption of 
centralized political sy stems . As we have seen, in pre-colonial 
Africa, the states underpinned specialization and trade ; they 
terminated f euds; they provided peace and s tabil ity and the conditions 
for private investment ; they formed public works; and they generated 
wealth, if only in the form of plunder. In these way s ,  the states 
secured prosperity for their citizens.  Service and others would argue 
that that is why they exist. 
Arguing against this position would be scholars such as Fried 
who see the state as essentially redistributive. The need to protect 
stratif ication, inequal ity , and privilege ,  it is held, provides the 
principal impetus to po litical organization. As we have seen, in 
pre-colonial Africa, states provided means for expropriation and 
redistribution. They underpinned slavery . They supported an 
aristocracy and a system of ca ste s .  Their rulers were relatively 
wealthy . And the prosperity they generated was unequally shared. 
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In the l iterature at large, then, we are exhorted to join the 
camp that sees the state a s  the source of collective prosperity or the 
camp that sees the state as the source of oppression. But the 
evidence forces us to realize that in pre-colonial Africa states were 
both. There are two faces to the relationship between political 
centralization and economic gain; prosperity and equality fail to go 
together . The question then arise s :  was the level of inequality a 
"reasonable" price to pay for securing the benefits of the state 
system? 
The question is diff icult to answer .  It does no good t o  
argue , as d i d  Fortes and Evans-Pr itchard, that " i t  must not be 
f orgotten • • • that those who derive maximum economic benefit from 
political office also have the maximum administrative, judicial,  and 
religious responsibilities" (pp.  8-9); for the question is not whether 
benefits were exchanged for costs , but rather whether the rate of 
exchange was "satisfactory . "  Moreover , it does l ittle good to note 
whether the people themselves were satisfied . For in the political 
realm, where private wealth is exchanged for public goods and 
services,  it "pays" to act dissatisfied if only to secure the services 
at a lower price. As noted by Skinner , for example,  the citizens of 
these states are just as likely as those el sewhere to complain about 
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the balance they secure in their exchange s  with the state : 
There is • • • always an air of mutual recrimination among the 
Mossi and their rulers about the l evel of reciprocation between 
them. The people admit that chiefs are indispensable; yet they 
complain that they are greedy -- they "eat" too much. The chiefs 
insist that it is  difficult to rule a territory and complain that 
the people are ungrateful . [ Skinner 196 2, p. 267 ] 
Rather than not ing that public services are in fact exchanged for 
private resources and rather than recording the atti tudes of the 
people, then, a less direct tactic is required. One that offer s  much 
promise is to enquire into the relative bargaining posi tions of the 
elites and the masses in the pre-colonial s tates. 
We have noted that in Central and Southern Africa, at least,  
land was relatively uniform in quality; moreover, being abundant , it  
was practically free. In societies where people derived their incomes 
from farming , this meant that they could readily move from one society 
to another. As Co lson notes , the result was that 
Given provocation, subjects could migrate beyond the borders a s  
w e l l  as within the boundaries of a kingdom. Malcontents [ could] 
join • • •  some [ other) pol ity • • • •  ( 1969, p.  44) 
Being mobile,  the citizenry could thus bargain for f avorable treatment 
by their ruler s .  Not only did they possess the means to exi t ,  
however; the evidence suggests that they also possessed 
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insti tutionalized means of giv ing voice and thereby securing more 
f avorable policies from their government s .  Commoner s of ten controlled 
particular offices, such as the "prime ministership , "  the principal 
administrativ e  office in the nation. Chief s of ten had rule through 
councils dominated by nonroyals . The Oyo Mesi is an extreme example ;  
it repeatedly deposed the Alaf in and of ten compelled his "suicide" 
(Morton-Williams , Law,  Atanda). In many cases,  commoners kept the 
selection and appointment of adminis trative personnel out of the hands 
of the king ; the rule of hereditary succession to headmanships or 
territorial chieftainships insured that lineage elders could control 
the selection of administrative personnel ( s ee the discuss ion in 
Southwold). The fact that in most state s the people � the army and 
that the monarchs had no independent full-time forces of his own also 
placed limits on central power . And the commoner s sometimes exerted 
considerable influence upon public officials through the agency of 
secret societies. 12
The extent to which commoner institutions prevailed even in 
centralized so cieties is suggested in the data. Commoner councils to 
debate policy existed in 36 percent of the central monarchies and 
chieftaincies ; and commoner councils to try cases existed in over 7 5  
percent o f  the chieftaincies and i n  virtually all o f  the central 
monarchies.  Moreover, as shown in Table 20, the exi stence of 
privileged strata, such as ari stocracies or ca ste s ,  failed to diminish 
the likelihood of the exi stence of such councils . Indeed, the data 
suggest the opposite;  rather than being antagonistic tendenci es, 
stratification and the inst itutionalization of commoner councils 
appear either to have been independent phenomena or to have 
systematically gone together ! 
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The citizenry thus pos sessed both the option to exit and the 
capacity to give voice to their interests. Further enhancing their 
bargaining power was the level of competition for office within the 
political elite. 
Long ago anthropologists studying African political systems 
discredited the notion that rules of descent placed unambiguous 
constraint s upon the selection of rulers .  Instead, as Gluckman 
writes, "rarely in Africa do we f ind rules which indicate clearly and 
definitely a single heir. Or if the rules themselves were 
clear, they operated uncertainly in practice . The result was that 
almost ever succession could raise rival claimants II ( 195 9 ,  P •  
46). 13 Contestants f o r  office had to gather a follow ing ; a n d  in
competing for supporters ,  they used their elite positions to generate 
benef its for the citizenry and made pledges of further benefits in the 
event that they should acquire power .  Competition took place during 
succession disputes, which were contested by branches of the royal 
clan, by the sons and the nephews of former king s ,  or by prominent 
regional chief s .  It also took place between the members of the ruling 
elite -- the cattle, and army and administrative chiefs in Burundi ,  
for example ; 14 between regional elite s,  such as Chitimukulu and
Mwamba, his regional rival, among the Bemba ; or between segments of 
the royal lineage, as among the Kanuri.  As Ronald Cohen wri te s :  
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The major internal opposition to the monar ch lay within the other 
segments of the royal l ineage , that is to say , among his 
competitors for the royal office . These men and their follower s ,  
us ing whatever support they could obtain among the titled 
nobility, presented a constant danger of usurption and even 
assassination to the rul ing monarch. Excessive tyranny , 
cont inued lack of mil itary success,  local uprisings , or even 
weakened physical condition through ill-health or old age ,  
stimulated such oppos ition. [ 197 0 ,  p.  192] 
The citizenry could thus exi t.  Through institutionalized 
means of access to power , they could oppose.  Given the presence of 
vigorous competition for public office , they could bargain and exact . 
While there was inequality in the states of pre-colonial Africa, the 
evidence thus make s it extremely diff icult to argue that the states 
could be employed by a privileged few to systematical ly oppress the 
masses or to exact resources f rom them. The states may well have, as 
we have seen, supported institutionalized patterns of inequality and 
underpinned systematic patterns of privilege. But the evidence 
suggests that those who held po sitions of privilege had to insure that 
the benefits created by the states were widely shared . For the 
bargaining power of the masses,  relative to the elites,  was s trong. 
And to retain power the elites had per force to serve the interests of 
their fol lowers,  if only because f ailing that , they would loose their 
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1 .  The sample set of societies and the magni tude of the 
documentation which my researcher covered for each is indicated 
in Table 2 1 :  
2 .  See Pirenne and Wal l erstein. See also Sabloff and Lamberg­
Karlovsky . Note also the following quot e :  "What was ' peace' for 
the author of Beowolf but the prospect of exchanging gifts 
between peoples ! "  From George Duby , The Early Growth of the 
European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the 
Twelfth Century ( Londo n :  Weidenfeld and Nichol son , 1 974) , quoted 
in Dalton, 1 97 8 ,  p. 13 1 .  
3 .  For the Sukuma, see Liebenow 1 96 0 ,  p .  234. For the Anuak, see 
47 
Gluckman 1 96 5 ,  pp. 125-126 . For the Tio, see Vansina, 1 97 3 ,  p.  
3 1 9 .  For the so cieties of Southeastern Nigeria, see Northrup and 
Ruel. For the kingdoms of Ruanda and Burundi, note Maquet, who 
s tate s :  "The Watutsi used several strategies but rarely, it 
seems, direct mil itary conque st. The ascendancy which the 
invaders gained from their war-like reputation and the prestige 
of their wealth enabled them to arbitrate disputes between 
peasants "  (Maquet, 1 97 1 ,  p. 143 ) .  
4 .  I did not do the coding myself, and purposely so . Rather, I 
f irst wrote a long paper in which I summarized the arguments 
concerning the economic basis for state formation in pre-colonial 
Africa. I developed a code book to coll ect information from the 
Human Relations Area Files which would allow me to test these 
arguments .  I then had the data coll ected "bl ind, " i . e. by coders 
who had not read my paper or discus sed the ideas in it w ith me. 
My research assistant s knew I was looking for relationships 
between economic and political factors in African tribal 
societies, but they had no knowl edge of the exact arguments I was 
trying to test nor of the particular relationships that would 
have serve as tests of them. By keeping them "blind" I thereby 
attempted to shield against bias in my research procedures. 
5 .  It should be noted that I reassessed these relationships whi le 
controlling f or the f actor of ecological variation. While the 
small number of cases made diff icult the use of such procedures, 
6 .  
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the resul ts suggest that "economic" f actors -- the possession of 
markets, caravans and long-distance trade -- continue to aff ect 
the level of pol itical centralization, even when ecological 
factor s are controlled.  
For general analyses of the public goods problem, see Olson; also 
Riker and Odershook. Application of economic analysis to the 
problem of insti tutional change, see Davis and North and North 
and Thomas .  For a n  interest ing appl ication t o  African materials, 
see Posner . For a tell ing cri tique of institutional arguments 
which fail to take account of the problem of public goods, see 
Popkin. 
7 .  One form of investment which correlated strongly with political 
centralization was investment in irrigation and water s torage. 
The number of cases was far too small to yield a significant 
relationship. Nonetheless, the parallel with Wittgorel's 
analy sis of non-African ca ses is intriguing. 
8 .  Indicative of the importance of the co sts o f  security i s  the 
magnitude of the change in the behavior of the long-distance 
traders when they were prov ided with protection by central 
states.  Hopkins notes that in the nineteenth century, Hausa 
caravans of 1 , 000 to 2 , 000 people were common. But he argues, 
There were diseconomies of scale which became apparent 
during the colonial period. With greater freedom of 
9 .  
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movement and more secure markets,  long distance traders 
began to travel in small groups , an arrangement which gave 
them flexibility in timing departures and arrivals , offered 
them a wider choice of routes,  and reduced their overheads , 
since it was no longer necessary to contribute towards the 
cost of guards and guides .  [ p .  6 3 ]  
B y  transf erring the provision of security out side of their firms , 
the organizer s of caravans were then able to operate at a lower 
scale and thus , given the nature of their enterpri se,  to conduct 
their bus iness more efficiently and so earn higher prof its. 
These gains in efficiency represented benefits from the existence 
of state s ,  and so const ituted material incentives for their 
f ormation. For an excellent review of the literature on long 
distance trade, see Jones ( 1980 ) :  pp. 12- 1 9 .  It should be noted 
that Jone s ,  in a personal communication, vigorously dissents from 
this portion of my analysi s .  
It should also be noted that the source o f  the relationship 
between craft specialization in political centralization doe s .!!Q!. 
result from the government' s  purchase of crafts.  Thus the data 
in Table 22 . 
10 . I also tested the relationship using analysis of variance. The 
relationships were not significant . However , as noted earlier , 
analysis of variance assumes a normal sampling distribution, 
which we lack here ; not much significance should therefore be 
so 
attributed to this result. 
1 1 .  As Wilks state s :  "The imposition of tolls and market dues 
12.  
was  • • • a widespread means of raising revenues and being 
relatively simple and virtually riskles s ,  it may well have been 
preferred • • •  to direct trading" 097 5 ,  p. 62) . 
For a general discus sion of the limi ts to power , see Beattie 
195 9 .  
13 . In Benin, primogeni ture determined succession to office . 
Nonetheles s ,  competi tion prevailed ; conflict simply centered on 
who was f irst born. See Crowder and Ikime, p. xi . 
In a passage typical of much recent work on oral tradi tions , 
Vansina discredi ts the myth of dynastic harmony and continuity 
among the Bushong; his comments are highly relevant her e :  
A reexamination of the data leads to the star tling 
conclusion that many successions were in f act disputed, thus 
giving substance to the Bushong f eeling that parties to most 
struggles were made up of the king and his followers on the 
one hand and his heir apparent and his follower s on the 
other . In almost every generation a struggle took place. 
[ 197 8 ,  p. 156 ] 
14 . The case of Rwanda and Burundi forms a constant counterpoint to 
this argument , simply because the relationship between the 
Watutsi and the Bahutu appears to have been among the most 
5 1  
exploitative in the traditional so cieties o f  Africa. 
Nonetheles s ,  within that so ciety , competition within the Watutsi 
rul ing class clearly existe d ;  it  appeared to curtail the degree 
to which the rulers were able to exact resources from their 
fol lowers ;  and it led to positive benef its for followers.  Thus , 
Gravel documents the "play for power" within the ruling stratum 
and the promotion of even Hutu l ineages into the rul ing "caste" 
that resulted (Gravel ; see also Lemarchand, 1 966 ) .  The 
institution of cl ient ship, and the competitive search among the 
ruling el ite for cl ients,  also placed limits on the degree to 
which the rulers could demand resources and services from their 
follower s ;  as Maquet states : "When a lord appeared to be too 
demanding of his cl ient s ,  he no longer found new ones,  and those 
he had would try to leave him" ( 1967 , p. 85 ) .  
Nonetheless, there can be l ittle doubt but that the position 
of the Hutu followers was f ar more unfavorable than that of their 
counterparts in other African societies . I would attribute this 
to relatively high ratio of men to land in this kingdom - ­
something that allowed the rulers to set a relatively high price 
on access to land. 
I would also argue that most commentators overestimate 
the degree of exploitation that existed in the pre-colonial era, 
an error that arises from extrapolating present information into 
the past. In the post-colonial era, the growth of population 
promoted and enabled even greater exactions by the rulers as the 
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price of Hutu access to land. In addition, the colonial rulers 
curtailed the level of competition within the Watutsi el ite,  thi s 
enabl ing the elite to cohere in opposition to the Hutu to a 
degree that hitherto had been impossible. Evidence of this is 
the argument of Lemarchand , who state s :  
The impact o f  indirect rul e has been, first o f  al l ,  t o  
destroy the old balance o f  forces between cattle chief s ,  
land chiefs and army chief s ,  which in previous times had 
served to protect the Hutu peasantry against undue 
exactions • • • •  Not only did [ the concentration of power ) 
deprive the Hutu of opportunities to play one chief off 
against another , but it also eliminated the channels of 
appeal off ered by the previous arrangement . ( 197 0 ,  pp. 
1 1 9-120) 
Lemarchand goes on to document the extent to which the rulers' 
levies increa sed under colonial rule and concludes by not ing that 
the exploitative aspect of the relationship between the Watutsi 
and the Bahutu was "unque stionably worse" under colonial rule ( p .  
123 ) .  
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Table 1 :  Po litical Structure and Ecological Variation 
( Percent ) 
Ecological ly Diversif ied Area: 
Pol itical S tructure Central Bureaucracy National Army Army Commanded At 
Kinship 17 Abs ent 40 Absent 40 Lo cal Level 40 
Chief& 50 Pr esent 60 Present 60 Regional Level 20 
Centralized 33 National Level 40 
Monarch 
N= 6 5 5 5 
Society Abuts on an Ecological Divide : 
Pol itical Structure Central Bureaucracy National Army Army Commanded At 
Kinship 12 Abs ent 2 5  Abs ent 3 8  Local Level 62 
Chiefs 3 8  Present 7 5  Present 62 Regional Level 0 
Central ized 50 National Level 38 
Monarch 
N= 8 8 8 8 
No Significant Ecological Variat ion: 
Pol itical S tructure* Central Bureaucracy* National Army Army Commanded At 
Kinship 40 Absent 67 Abs ent 50 Local Level 50 
Chief& 20 Pr esent 3 3  Present 50 Regional Level 10  
Centralized 40 National Level 40 
Monarch 
N• 20 18  20 20 
* Chi squared significant at . 10 level
Po l itical S tructure* 
Yes No 
Kinship 15 3 2  
Chiefs 3 1  42 
Central 
Monarchs 54 26 
N = 13 1 9  
Pol itical Structure** 
Yes No 
Kinship 0 43 
Chiefs 45 24 
Central 
Monarchs 55 33 
N = 1 1  2 1  
Table 2 :  Relation With Measure of Trade 
Societies Possess Market Center s? 
( Percent ) 
Central Bureaucracy* National Army Army Commanded At 
Ye s No Ye s No Ye s No 
Absent 42 87 Absent 54 50 
Present 5 8  13 Present 46 50 
12 16 13 16 
Societies Po ssess Trade Caravans? 
( Percent ) 
Central Bureaucracy* National Army 
Yes No Yes No 
Abs ent 44 7 9  Absent 45 56 
Present 56 2 1  Present 5 5  44 
9 1 9  1 1  20 
Local Level 15 6 
Regional Level 54 50 
National Level 3 1  44 
13 16 
Army Commanded At 
Yes No 
Local Level 18  0 
Regional Level 46 56 
36 44 
1 1  1 8  
Was Trade Mainly Local ( L )  o r  Long Distance (LD ) ?  
( Percent ) 
Pol itical Structure*** Central Bureaucracy* National Army 
L LD 
Kinship 53 6 Absent 
Chiefs 0 50 Present 
Central 
Monarchs 47 44 
N= 15 16 
* Chi squared significant at . 10 level
** Chi squared significant at .OS  level 
***Chi squared s ignificant at . 0 1  level 
L LD L LD 
6 0  3 1  Absent 47 47 
40 6 9  Present 53 53 
15 13 15 15 
Army Commanded At 
L LD 
Local Level 6 13 
Regional Level 47 47 
National Level 47 40 
15 15 
7 8  
Tab le 3 :  Po litical Centralization and Feuds 
Are There Feuds?  
( Percent �Yes' ) 
Po litical Structure*"'* Central Bureaucracy*"'* National Army Axmy Commanded At 
N N N 
Kinship 89 9 Absent 7 2  9 Abs ent 6 9  16 Local Level 
Chiefs 7 8  9 Present 27 18 Present 43 14 Regional Level 
Central ized 23 13 National Level 
Monarchs 
*"'* Chi squared signif icant at . 0 1  level 
Table 4 :  Pol itical Structure and Private Investment 
Are There Instances Where Large Captial 
Investments Axe Made by Private Groups ? 
(Percent ) 
N 
1 00 2 
6 9  16 
42 12 
Political Structure Central Bureaucracy National Army Army Commanded At 
Yes No Ye s No Ye s No Ye s No 
Kinship 0 36 Absent so S2 Abs ent so S2 Local Level so 44 
Chiefs 3 3  32 Present so 48 Present SO 48 Reg ional Level 17 4 
Central 6 7  3 2  National Level 3 3  S2 
Monarchs 
N = 6 28 6 28 6 2S 6 2S 
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Table 5 :  Po litical Centralization, Craft 
Special ization and the Holding of Inventories 
Carrying of Large Inventories? 
(Percent ) 
Po litical Structure** Central Bureaucracy** National Azmy 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinship 8 45 Absent 45 84 Abs ent 3 8  6 1  
Chiefs 3 1  3 0  Pr esent 55 16 Present 62 3 9  
Central 62 25 
Monarchs 
N = 13 20 11 21 13 18 
Craft Specialis ts? 
(Percent ) 
Po litical Structure*** Central Bureaucracy** National Azmy 
Yes No Ye s No Yes No 
Kinship 2 1  45 Abs ent 43 100 Abs ent 46 7 5  
Chiefs 25 55 Present 57 0 Present 54 25 
Central 54 0 
Monarchs 
N = 24 1 1  2 1  1 0  24 8 
** Chi squared significant at . 05 level 
*** Chi squared s ignif icant at . 0 1  level 
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Axmy Commanded At 
Ye s No 
Local Level 15 6 
Regional Level 3 9  6 1  
Nat ional Level 46 33 
13 18 
Azmy Commanded At 
Ye s No 
Local Level 12 0 
Regional Level 46 7 5  
Nat ional Level 42 25 
24 8 
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Table 6 :  Soil Fertil ity and Po l itical S tructure 
ls the Quality of Soils High by Comparison 
With The Soils in Surrounding Ar eas? 
( Percent ) 
Political Structure Central Bureaucracy National Army* Army Commanded At* 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinship 17 50 Absent 62 83 Absent 3 5  83 Local Level 12 0 
Chiefs 33 17 Present 3 8  17 Present 6 5  1 7  Reg ional Level 3 5  83 
Central 50 33 National Level 53 17 
Monarchs 
N = 18 6 16 6 17 6 17 6 
* Chi squared significant at . 10 level
Table 7 :  Population Density And Po litical Centralization 
U sing Upper Estimates of Population Density : 
Population Density 
Po l itical Structure Central Bureaucracy+ National Army+++ Army Commanded At+++ 
Lo ( l )  Hi (2 )  Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi 
Kinship 33% 25% Absent 56% 7 1% Absent 7 5% 29% Lo cal Level 7 5% 29% 
Chiefs 22 25 Present 44 29 Present 25 7 1  Reg ional Level 0 0 
Central National Level 25 7 1  
Monarchs 44 50 
N = 9 8 9 7 8 7 8 7 
Using Lower Estimates of Population Density : 
Population Density 
Po litical Structure Central Bureaucracy 
Lo ( 3 )  Hi(4) Lo Hi 
Kinship 60% 17% Abs ent 80% 20% 
Chiefs 20 17 Present 20 80 
Central 
Monarchs 20 66 
N = 5 6 5 5 
Upper estimates of population density : 
( 1) Lo : 40 persons or less per sq . mile 
( 2 )  Hi: Over 40 persons per sq . mile 
+ p < . 10 ,  Fisher exact test 
+++p < . 0 1 ,  Fisher exact test 
National Army+ Army Commanded At* 
Lo Hi Lo Hi 
Absent 1 00% 0% Local Level 1 00% 0% 
Present 0 100 Reg ional Level 0 0 
National Level 0 100 
5 5 5 5 
Lower estimates of population densi ty : 
( 3 ) Lo : 10 persons or less per sq . mile 
(4) Hi: Over 10 persons per sq . mile
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Controlling for Population Density 
( Percent ) 




0 50 Absent 
5 0  1 7  Pr esent 
5 0  33 
2 6 




0 40 Absent 
0 20 Present 
100 40 
2 5 
( 1) Low :  40 persons or less per square mile 
(2) High : Over 40 persons per square mile 
Market Center s ?  
Yes No 
25 100 
7 5  0 
4 4 
Market Center s? 
Yes No 
5 0  100 
50 0 
4 2 
8 3  
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Table 9 :  Mining and Centralization 
Does This Society' s Territories Include 
Gold Mines ?  
( Percent ) 
Pol itical Structure** Central Bureaucracy** National Army Army Commanded At 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinship 0 3 S  Absent 2S 76 Absent 2 S  S6 Local Level 2S 8 
Chiefs 0 3 1  Present 7 S  24 Pr esent 7 S  44 Regional Level 2S S6 
Central 100 3 1  National Level s o  3 6  
Monarchs 
N = 4 26 4 2S 4 2S 4 2S 
Copper Kines ?  
( Percent ) 
Political Structure* Central Bureaucracy** National Army Army Commanded At 
Yes No Yes No Ye s No Ye s No 
Kinship 0 37 Absent 0 77 Ab sent so S4 Local Level 0 8 
Chiefs 0 30 Present 1 00 23 Present s o  46 Regional Level so S4 
Central 100 33 National Level so 38 
Monarchs 
N = 2 27 2 26 2 26 2 26 
Salt Kines? 
( Percent ) 
Political Structure Central Bureaucracy* National Army Army Commanded At 
Yes No Ye s No Yes No Ye s No 
Kinship 0 37 Absent 0 74 Abs ent 0 so Local Level 0 8 
Chiefs so 26 Present 100 26 Present 100 so Regional Level 100 so 
Central so 37 National Level 0 42 
Monarchs 
N = 2 27 2 27 2 26 2 26 
Iron Mines? 
( Percent ) 
Pol itical Structure* Central Bureaucracy* National Army Army Commanded At* 
y N y N y N y N 
Kinship 2S 37 Absent so 82 Absent 42 S6 Local Level 2 S  0 
Chiefs 8 37 Present so 1 8  Pr esent S8 44 Regional Level 42 S6 
Central 67 26 National Level 33 44 
Monarchs 
N .. 12 19  12 17  12 1 8  1 2  1 8  
* Chi squared signif icant a t  . 10 level
**Chi squared s ignificant at . OS level 
Table 1 0 :  S tate Formation and Pub l ic Goods 
Were There Roads ?  
( Percent 'Yes' ) 
Pol itical Structure** Central Bureaucracy++ National Army Army Commanded At 
Kinship 0 Absent 14 Absent 27 Local Level 27 
Chiefs 20 Present 88 Pr esent 50 Regional Level 50 
Centralized 7 5  National Level 50 
Monarch 
N-= 3 0  2 9  2 9  2 9  
Were There Bridges? 
( Percent 'Yes' ) 
Po litical Structure* Central Bureaucracy+++ National Army* Army Commanded At* 
Kinship 0 Absent 0 Absent 0 Local Level 0 
Chiefs 0 Present 40 Present 17 Regional Level 0 
Centra lized 22 National Level 20 
Monarch 
N: 27 26 26 26 
Were There Pontoons? 
( Percent 'Yes' ) 
Pol itical Structure* Central Bureaucracy National Army* Army Commanded At* 
Kinship 
Chiefs 













Were There Canals? 
( Percent 'Yes' ) 
Pol itical Structure* 
Kinship 
Chiefs 








Abs ent 5 
Present 40 
26 
* Chi squared significant at . 10 level
. 05 level ** Chi squared significant at 
++ p < . 0 5 .  Fisher exact test 
+++ p < . 0 1 .  Fisher exact test 
National Army* 
Abs ent 13 
Pr esent 17 
27 
Local Level 7 
Regional Level 0 
National Level 33 
25 
Army Commanded At* 
Local Level 13 
Regional Level 0 
National Level 20 
3 1  
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Table 1 1 :  S lave Trade and Pol i tical Structure 
Trade in Slaves?  
( Percent ) 
Po l itical Stucture** Central Bureaucracy*** National Army*** 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinship 0 40 Abs ent 25 83 Absent 1 1  6 5  
Chiefs 22 32 Present 7 5  17 Pr esent t 89 35 
Central 7 8  2 8  
Monarchs 
N= 9 25 8 23 9 23 
Import Guns? 
( Percent ) 
Po litical Stucture Central Bureaucracy** National Army 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinship 10  38 Absent 2 9  7 9  Absent 5 0  50 
Chiefs 40 25 Present 7 1  21  Present 5 0  50 
Central 50 3 8  
Monarchs 
N-= 10  24 7 24 10 22 
** Chi squared significant at .OS level 
*** Chi squared significant at . 0 1  level 
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Army Commanded At 
Yes No 
Local Level 1 1  3 0  
Regional Level 22 4 
National Level 67 65  
9 23 
Army Commanded At 
Ye s No 
Local Level 40 41 
Reg ional Level 10 9 
National Level 5 0  5 0  
10 22 
8 7  
Table 1 2 :  The S lave Economy 
Trade in Slaves?  Import guns? 
( Percent ) ( Percent ) 
Yes No Ye s No 
Are ther e :  
Hark.et Center s? 
Yes so 41 S6 38 
No so S9 44 62 
N= 8 22 9 2 1  
Craft Specialists? 
Ye s 100 60 90 63 
No 0 40 10 37 
N= 9 2S 10 24 
** * 
Caravans? 
Yes 88 17 S6 27 
No 12 83 44 73 
N= 8 23 9 22 
**'* 
Was Trade Mainly 
Local?  
Yes 2S S9 30 S7 
No 7S 41 7 0  43 
N= 8 22 10  2 1  
* 
Was there carrying 
of inventories? 
Yes 89 2 1  7 0  26 
No 1 1  7 9  3 0  74 
N• 9 24 10 23 
*** ** 
*Chi squared significant at . 10 level
**Chi squared s ignificant at . OS level 
***Chi squared s ignificant at . O l  level 




Table 1 3 :  Slave Trade and Feuds 
Trade in Slaves? Import guns ? 
( Percent ) ( Percent ) 
Yes No Ye s No 
38 62 62 52 
62 38 38 48 
8 2 1  8 2 1  
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Table 14:  Social Domination and Political Centralization 




















































( Percent ) 
24 
3 8  
3 8  
29 
3 5  









8 9  
Table 1 5 : Stratification and Centralization 
Are There Castes7 









3 1  
( Precent 'Yes' ) 
Central Bureaucracy** National Army 
Absent 27 Absent 3 5  
Present 5 0  Present 2 9  
30 3 1  
I s  there a Class o f  Nob les or an Aristocracy ? 
( Percent 'Yes' ) 













** Chi squared s ignificant at .OS  level 
*** Chi squared significant at . 0 1  level 
Abs ent 46 
Present 6 9  
26 




Army Commanded At 
Lo cal Level 
Regional Level 
National Level 
9 0  
5 0  
3 5  
2 5  
3 1  
5 0  
46 
7 3  
26 
Table 16 : Do Craft Specialists Rave the Right to Set Prices .  






Restrict Entry or Limit Output? 
(Percent 'Yes' ) 
Central Bureaucracy National Army 
Absent 3 3  Absent 67  
Present 67 Present 3 3  
1 5  1 8  









Table 17 : Chiefs and Economic Redistribution 
Do chiefs have monopo ly rights? 
(Percent 'Yes' ) 
Yes 57 
No 1 1  
Not Applicable 3 1  
� 3 5  
Table 1 8 :  Most Frequently Mentioned Obj ects o f  Chiefs' Monopoly 
Obj ect No . of mentions 
Ivory 6 
Kola 2 
S laves 6 
Cattle 2 
Skins 2 
Parts of game killed 10  
9 2  
Table 1 9 :  Chief s and Inequality 
( Percent ) 
Do Kings or Chiefs have : 










More Slaves/ retainer s ?  
Yes 
No 



















2 9  
3 5  




5 9  
6 
34 
3 2  
6 2  
9 
2 9  
3 4  
6 1  
6 
32 
3 1  
5 9  
9 
3 1  
32 
9 3  
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Table 20 : Commoner Institutions and Stratification 
Were there aristocrats ? Were there castes? 
Yes No Yes No 
Was there a commoner 
council to : 
Debate po licy? 
Yes 40 15 40 22 
No 6 0  1 5  so 3 9  
Not applicable 0 6 9  10 3 9  
N= 1 5  13 10 23 
Try Cases? 
Yes 93 3 1  7 8  6 3  
No 7 6 9  20 3 8  
Not applicable 0 0 0 0 
N 15  13  9 24 
*'** 
*** Chi squared significant at . 0 1  level 
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Table 2 1 :  Societies and Documentation 
Number of Pages Number of Pages 
Name of Society of Documentation Name of Society of Do cumentation 
Bambara 1 , 127 Cbagga 1, 9 86 
Dog on 1 , 13 2  Ngondo 1 ,474 
Mo ssi 942 Pygmies 1 , 35 0  
Maude 605 Azande 3 . 264 
Tal l ensi 964 Hongo 773 
Ashanti 3 , 523 Rundi 1 , 3 14 
Katab 3 52 Mbundu 847 
Nupe 856 Bemba 830 
Tiv 2 , 8 9 1  Ila 998 
Yoruba 1 , 637 Lozi 1 , 63 5  
Fang l, 117 Tonga 1 , 6 16 
Nuer 1 , 54 1  Ngoni 1 , 123 
Shilluk 1 , 073 Thong a 1 , 23 1 
Ganda 2 , 2 6 1  Yao 555 
Dorobo 3 54 Bushmen 1 , 259 
Kikuyu 1 . 950 Hottentot 1 , 3 3 9  
Luo 463 Lovedu 455 
Kasai 2 , 085 Tana la 3 54 
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Table 2 2 :  Govermnent and Craft s  
Is Govermnent the major 
consumer of crafts?  
No.  % 
Yes 4 1 1  
No 1 5  42 
Not applicable 1 5  42 
No information 2 5 
Total 3 6  100 
